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Abstract—The explicit link between Promise Theory
and Information Theory, while perhaps obvious, is laid
out explicitly here. It’s shown how causally related obser-
vations of promised behaviours relate to the probabilistic
formulation of causal information in Shannon’s theory,
and thus clarify the meaning of autonomy or causal
independence, and further the connection between infor-
mation and causal sets. Promise Theory helps to make
clear a number of assumptions which are commonly
taken for granted in causal descriptions. The concept of
a promise is hard to escape. It serves as proxy for intent,
whether a priori or by inference, and it is intrinsic to the
interpretations of observations in the latter.
I. INTRODUCTION
Promise theory describes interactions between gen-
eralized agents and their possible outcomes. Promises
declare possible causal pathways by defining and doc-
umenting ‘outcomes’ as possible boundary states of
process graphs. In so doing, they provide scalable
definitions of ‘intent without anthropomorphism’ and
measurement, based on agents’ assessments of one
another. Promise Theory has now been in use for over
15 years and has been applied to many different kinds
of process networks [1], [2].
The goal of this letter is to describe the rela-
tionship between Promise Theory’s model of agents
and promises, and the statistical information passed
between them as described by Shannon’s Theory of
Communication. Information Theory relies on scale
invariant probabilities, whose meanings are inherently
ambiguous, but sometimes phenomena are scale depen-
dent. One of the aims of Promise Theory is to move
beyond these ambiguities, while suppressing details
that are not measurable in practice anyway for many
systems.
II. PROBLEM AND NOTATION
Using the standard promise notation from [1], there
are three main interaction patterns we need to distin-
guish and account for: Let A be any agent (on any
scale), whose interior structure is unspecified. In this
letter, its identity will be closely associated with its role
in a particular interaction pattern so we can simplify
the notation by taking A ∈ {S,R, I}, for sender,
receiver, and intermediate nodes.
Consider three basic cases. The simplest is a uni-
lateral promise declaration of bS by S, without accep-
tance by a promisee R:
S
+bS−−→ R, (1)
i.e. the promise meets with ‘deaf ears’. The second is
a promise of bS with partial or complete acceptance
bR by its recipient:
S
+bS−−→
−bR←−−−
R, (2)
and the final is the chain propagation of influence by
conditional promises, where bI is promised if and only
if bS is accepted by I:
S
+bS−−→
−bI←−−
I
+bI |bS−−−−→
−bR←−−−
R (3)
Since agents make promises only for themselves, these
labels S, I , and R play a second role as subscripts
to indicate the source of each promised measure.
The promise bodies represent the details of what is
promised, and these are set-valued measures.
An agent A′ must assess the extent to which a
promise piA made by A has been kept or not. If privy to
the interior process states ΣA for a promised process,
this is partly determined by that information, else it’s
arbitrary. The assessment by A′ is denoted αA′(piA),
and can take several forms, some of which may involve
‘probabilities’ for certain states σi ∈ ΣA, where the
Latin indices run over the different symbols in ΣA
(see figure 1). The symbols, which are members of
the body sets bA take values from the alphabet of
interior agent states ΣA, and I assume that every agent
speaks a language composed of an alphabet Στ for that
particular promise type τ 1. For a promise:
pi : A
bA−−→ A′, (4)
the promise body bA is a constraint on A, consisting
of a type label τ and a measure which belongs to the
alphabet of the promise language Σpi
b = 〈τ, χ ∈ Σpi〉 (5)
1A further subtlety, which one normally ignores based on an
assumption of homogeneity or global symmetry for types τ , is that
the promise body belongs uniquely to its originating agent A, so the
alphabets for a promise of type τ are really private to each agent–
and we should really write τA. However, since non-shared types
and alphabets would not result in binding at all, we can effectively
ignore those cases where agents speak incompatible languages and
absorb such cases into the assessments of promises that are not kept.
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Fig. 1: In Shannon’s theory, information is defined statis-
tically, from transmissions composed from prior alphabets
ΣA for sender (A = S) and receiver A = R. The entropic
measures of interaction ‘effectiveness’ follow from statistical
observation and inference between the simultaneous obser-
vations of these endpoint agents S and R. The common
view of this gets into trouble once more careful relativistic
considerations are taken into account.
The overlap of two promise bodies of the same type
of promise2. Finally, we recall that agents of any type
exist in both positive and negative polarities.
An assessment of whether or not a promise is
considered kept may be made on a variety of scales and
criteria. The symbols αA(·) is used for assessments of
various kinds, to be detailed in context. The semantic
or symbolic assessment of a single sample, for each
single promise-keeping event is simple the outcome:
αA(x(pi)) : pi → (x ∈ χτ ) (6)
where x(pi) denotes the sampling of a symbol x from
the channel formed maintained by the keeping of
the promise pi, Alternatively, we could evaluate the
semantic average assessment, relative to the promise
declaration:
αA(pi) : pi → {KEPT, NOT-KEPT}. (7)
A collection of such events leads to a distribution of
outcomes, which we can denote either as an average
α() or as a pro-forma ‘probability’3:
αA(pi)
pA(σpi)
 : σpi ∈ χτ → [0, 1] (8)
2For example, and agent S could be an Light Emitting Diode
(LED) that promises from within a finite alphabet of red, green,
blue (RGB) symbols. The receiver might be a light sensitive detector
which can only detect shades of what it calls green (G).
3The concept of a probability involves plenty of semantics that are
often taken for granted. Here we needn’t take issue with different
definitions, as any will do the job.
where the ensemble is defined over a specified set of
S samples
N∑
i=1
αA(x(pi) = x)
N
→ pA(x) (9)
These ‘probabilities’ are the quantitative scale ra-
tios, used in definitions of information, according to
the Shannon theory of communications [3], [4]. How
ensembles are constructed is important, but not defined
a priori. If one has a controlled environment which
can promise repeatable configurations, them there can
be spacelike (co-temporal) or frequentist probabilities,
and there are timelike (temporal) of Bayesian proba-
bilities, which have different interpretations. In either
regime, we have probabilities pA assessed by each
agent A. However, in order to get to information, we
need assessments made by more than one agent: both
a sender and a receiver.
We can use these measures to pursue three issues:
• The meaning of autonomy, or causal indepen-
dence of agents.
• The transmission of intent or expectation as sym-
bols.
• The transmission of observations and assessment
from symbols.
These three matters are related but distinct. In related
work, considering the concept individuality [5], the au-
thors use mutual information as the criterion by which
to define autonomy or causal independence of agents.
They show that the assumption of individuality is con-
sistent with immunity from external information prop-
agation. A compatible answer is implicit in Promise
Theory, but without the implicit assumptions about
probability. Here, the axioms contend that all agents are
a priori autonomous or causally independent, and may
forego that autonomously, which amounts to a subtle
difference. The two viewpoints are entirely consistent
where they overlap, but the formulation based on
Shannon’s mutual information is not relativistically
covariant, whereas a formulation based on promises
is. In principle, the promise view is not only simpler
but reveals more of the interaction picture than the
information view, since the entropy functions are based
on ensemble averages. I’ll return to this at the end.
III. SIMULTANEOUS CHARACTERISTICS
In Shannon’s statistical measures of information,
there is no relativity of end points incorporated into the
picture, despite the end points being causally distant
from one another. Events are assumed simultaneous
and therefore form local matrices as viewed by a single
‘godlike’ observer, with infinite and immediate access
(figure 2). Promises remain true to a tensorial picture
with explicit construction of multi-local behaviours.
A joint probability matrix incorporates the idea that
the receiver may get a transmitted symbol wrong with
a certain off-diagonal probability, if the non-diagonal
elements are non-zero. The joint probability matrix,
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Fig. 2: Observation by a trusted third party observer.
which depends on two ends of a causal channel, is
defined by:
pA(σS , σR) ≡ pA(σS AND σR), (10)
as used in Shannon’s formulation of informational
entropy, is assumed to be observable (by the godlike
observer who computes information transfer). It re-
duces to the lower rank product state pA(σS)pA(σR)
when σS and σR are independent variables. As we see
below, the existence of this measure assumes coarse
graining in a time and space, so its interpretation
may be ambiguous. Independently of the definition of
measures, the joint matrix represents the agreed ‘prob-
ability’ that S and R sample common symbols at the
same moments. Since the symbols are actually private
interior representations of the agents, in Promise The-
ory, they are assessed autonomously. What this really
means is that the observation of a correspondence of
symbols at the two ends of the channel σS ∼ σR, when
the symbols coincide in the overlap χ = χS ∩χR, are
therefore ‘equal’ in the sense that they play an invariant
role which is understood (independently) by each end
of the channel between S and R. The agents needn’t
have a common representation of these symbols, so we
cannot say that σS = σR, as measured by a godlike
third party, but they consistently represent the same
information to each party.
IV. SCALAR PROMISE (CASE 1)
An assessment of probability for interaction by any
agent (of symbols σ ∈ Σpi for the promise pi), over
some ensemble of multiple promise-keeping events,
relies on repeated observations under coarse-grained
conditions. In the case of a unilateral promise from
S, with no acceptance by R, R makes no assessment
of any promise pi at all (indeed, it doesn’t even know
about it), so we have simply:
pS(σS , σR) = p(σS)× 0 (11)
pR(σS , σR) = 0× p(σR) (12)
i.e. the joint probability is entirely separable, and is
identically zero, as the agents are fully independent.
Any similarity of symbols, seen only by a privileged
third party T (figure 2), they were able to measure
would be entirely coincidental, as they are not able to
observe one another. So the mutual information of the
agents is identically zero in this case:
I(S;R) = 0. (13)
Before leaving this elementary case, we should point
out the concept of scope, which is a shorthand for a
large number of implicit promises.
pi : S
+bS−−→
Ω
R. (14)
The symbol Ω for scope, implies a set of agents to
whom the promise of observability has been granted
and accepted. In this case, only R has been offered
this information, but this is important for the next two
cases. In other words, only agents A ∈ Ω can form
assessments of the promise pi, even though they are
not explicitly mentioned in it, and the outcome may
not be any of their business per se. These agents in
scope are the typical observers in quantum mechanical
scenarios, for instance. They are third parties who look
upon other agents and calibrate the outcomes according
to their own alphabets of states.
V. PROMISE BINDING (CASE 2)
From the foregoing definitions, we can now com-
plete the promises for an information channel, in the
Shannon sense, for a single promise with b(pi) =
〈τ, χ〉, by adding the acceptance promise, which is
normally taken for granted:
S
+bS−−→ R
R
−bRS−−−→ S, (15)
Here, it’s assumed that τ(bS) = τ(bR), i.e. the agents
are aligned in their ‘intent’. Now that R accepts the
promise from S,
bS = 〈τ, χS〉 (16)
bRS = 〈τ, χR〉 (17)
and, for a non-zero channel to form, we require the
channel overlap of languages to be non-empty:
χR|S = χS ∩ χR 6= ∅. (18)
The subscripts here seem pedantic, but are used to
remind us that what is offered bS is initiated only by
S and only concerns S’s interior state (call it σS); and,
in receiving data from S, R has its own a choice about
what it is willing or able to accept—that choice needs
an ‘R’ annotation to identify it as R’s ‘intent’. Even
though it’s based on data from S, the data are only
accepted at R’s behest. It is not necessary to assume
that R is compelled to accept, by some force. Indeed,
we know that this viewpoint is inconsistent [1].
Using the subscript R|S (R’s acceptance given S’s
offer), we indicate this implicit causal dependency.
Later (in case 3) this dependency will be made explicit
when an agent bases a new promised value (sent
downstream) on a prior one received from upstream,
forming causal chains.
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With channel binding now accepted, there is a new
issue: for agents to be able to assess one another
they must be promised access to information about
each other’s interior states, not only a declaration of
the promise of expected behaviour. In other words,
the promises in (15) are sufficient to enable causal
influence, but are not sufficient to be able to assess
it from mutual information, since the promises in (15)
are not mutual, merely complementary. This is related
to the generally assumed observability issue (even
for godlike observers). We might treat observability
promises as part of ‘scope’ to avoid a proliferation of
promise arrows, but here that would be sweeping key
issues under the rug. We have to deal with two kinds of
promise in order to verify behaviours observationally:
• A promise of behaviour is something with the sta-
tus of a ‘charge’, it allows inference of propagated
influence. It refers to promises which are locally
invariant over the events that confirm them.
• A promise of observational outcome, on the other
hand, requires access to private interior states,
which is additional information about dynamical
changes. and the observation of acceptance is an
acknowledgment.
Let’s define the alphabet of possible values gener-
ated by the set of relevant interior states for S and
R by σS and σR. These states exist at opposite
ends of the channel but they can be subject of a
promise made by each end to the other:
S
+σS−−−→ R (19)
R
+σR−−−→ S (20)
In order to be observed, the other end must accept
the promised symbols, but they may accept a
different set:
S
−σS|R−−−−→ R (21)
R
−σR|S−−−−→ S (22)
so that what is actually possible to transmit is the
overlap:
S → R : σS ∩ σR|S ≤ σS (23)
R→ S : σR ∩ σS|R ≤ σR (24)
This is what we mean by observability. The ≤
can also account for noise, but it has a different
semantic origin. Noise could always be corrected,
as Shannon showed, but the inability or unwilling-
ness to receive certain symbols cannot.
These observability promises are often presumed
as ‘bundled’ in our world view, when the first
kind of promise has been given, but that’s not
strictly necessary. We don’t always have access
to observe the outcomes of events. For example,
a particle might promise a certain charge, but we
have no exterior field or detector to register the
forces it may experience.
Over one or more assessments by the two agents, en-
sembles can be formed to define probability measures
from each agent’s independent observational perspec-
tives.
pS(σS , σR) 6= 0 (25)
pR(σS , σR) 6= 0. (26)
S assesses this as the result of the confirmation it sent
and the acceptance of an acknowledgment received.
The existence of this matrix now depends on two sets
of promise bindings:
• Invariant intent (e.g. ‘charge’ in physics), and
• On-going observability of interior states (events
and transitions).
When the alignment of states is merely coincidental,
then over ensemble we would observe that
pS(σS , σR) → pS(σS)pS(σR) (27)
pR(σS , σR) → pR(σS)pR(σR), (28)
which contains non-local information. This assessment
cannot be made unless observability promises have
been offered, accepted, and kept for the agent assessing
the joint states. The mutual information, as used in [5],
requires this minimum observability for some observer.
Assuming an agent A has such access, then it is
the average overlap remaining once the probability
of coincidence of random processes is subtracted, as
measured by an independent observer A:
IA(S;R) =
∑
σS ,σR
pA(σS , σR) log
pA(σS , σR)
pA(σS)pA(σR)
,
which is clearly zero when4:
p(σS , σR) = p(σS)p(σR). (29)
We can now consider which promises are required
to evaluate the probabilities presumed to be calculable
in the informational entropies of a channel.
• A self-assessment pA(σA) (e.g. pS(σS)) can al-
ways be obtained ‘immediately’ according to S’s
interior process and clock.
• A remote assessment pA(σA′) (e.g. pS(σR)) is
reliant on data being propagated along the infor-
mation channel, which implies that source and
receiver are never simultaneous. This transmission
depends on two promises being kept. For the
example:
R
+σR−−−→ S (30)
S
−σS|R−−−−→ R. (31)
Looking for a measure of correlation between
the symbols at source and receiver still doesn’t
discount the possibility that random processes
4The weakness of treating the agents as random processes is that
we have to deal with average causality and probable measures over
coarse grained ensembles, when what we really want to deal with
individual interactions from the bottom up.
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led to a coincidence of symbols. For the causal
information transmission we want the conditional
transmission only, which can be excluded sta-
tistically over ensemble averages by using the
definition for mutual information, but here I want
to emphasize that this mutual information is only
an average proxy for causal propagation implicit
(namely that S signals R and then R acknowl-
edges receipt, as in so-called reliable network
protocols, such as TCP/IP):
S
+σS−−−→ R (32)
R
−σR|S−−−−→ S (33)
R
+σR|σR|S−−−−−−→ S (34)
S
−σS|R−−−−→ R. (35)
This is the precise statement, on a transactional
basis, which is usually coarse-grained to yield
common sets of mutual probabilities.
By stating (promising) the mutual information above,
we effectively timestamp all events on the interior of a
single agent, e.g. R claiming that this is instantaneous
for R. This is an approximation which is good enough
on human scales, but which fails on computational and
quantum scales.
On the question of autonomy, or causal indepen-
dence: regardless of our ability to define probabilistic
measures, one sees that the promise in equation (34)
is empty if the conditional acceptance of the input in
(35) is absent, which is the only one in which an
agent is influenced by another agent. So, at a basic
level, the agents are always causally independent, but
may promise to forego that autonomy by accepting
inputs from other agents. It’s the presence of such
receptor promises which therefore represent the causal
‘boundary’ for influence. This applies on any scale,
since we have not made any assumptions about the
interior nature of the agent. It’s a form of Gauss’ law,
noted in [6], which may be expressed by saying that
what is promised from within a boundary depends a
priori only on what is on its interior.
We also see these points reflected in the flow of
process time. In a classical Newtonian view, time is
a universal and simultaneous quantity that presumes
instantaneous access to a single calibrated clock for the
entire universe. We know this to be an idealization that
fails under many circumstances, and we must instead
specify which observer’s clock is being used to count
events that we call time [7], [8]. The only things that S
and R know about observations of one another is that
their receipt comes after the samples were obtained.
So, according to either S’s clock tS or R’s clock,
tS(σS) < tS(σR|S) (36)
tR(σS) < tR(σR|S), (37)
and similarly,
tS(σR) < tS(σS|R) (38)
tR(σR) < tR(σS|R). (39)
This might seem excessively pedantic for mundane
human systems, or biological timescales, but these
distinctions are quite important for processes that race
one another with split-second timings in computer
networks, and sub-atomic physics.
A third party observer watching such a transition
from an independent vantage point could calibrate
as an impartial arbiter (see figure 2); however, its
ability to do so is only uncontested if the promises
of observability of S and R by T are much faster than
the changes taking place between S and R5. If we
try to parameterize the separation between these causal
interactions, then we have a choice about how to rep-
resent the partial ordering. Space and proper time can
be proxies for that ordering, but since the separation
is only a convolution of two autonomous processes,
the interpretation is moot. The joint probability has
the form of a faithful assessment by a sufficiently fast
third party (where ‘fast’ means satisfying the Nyquist
law over relevant timescales for pi):
p(S,R) =
= αT
(
pi(+)(S) AND pi(−)(R)
)
= αT
(
pi(+)(S)
)
· αT
(
pi(−)(R)
)
=
∫ ∞
0
ds
(
α
(+)
T (S, tT ) · α(−)T (R, tT + ds)
)
(40)
If we assume a vanishing observability delay, then this
has the simplified form:
p(+,−) =
∫ ∞
0
dA
(
ψ(+)(A)ψ(−)(A)
)
(41)
which has the form of a spatial convolution, familiar
in quantum mechanics6.
VI. CAUSAL CHAINS (CASE 3)
All the elements are now in place for the general
case of a causal chain. Note, there is no assumption
of a Markov chain, without hysteresis, nor any pre-
sumption of a global symmetry. Agents may contain
any amount of memory and can incorporate hysteresis,
absorption, and so on. They also retain their individ-
uality by default, and must make explicit promises to
constrain their behaviour and demonstrate transmission
of influence. The question is whether such effects
5This notion is encapsulated in the Shannon-Nyquist sampling
law. In classical science, we are used to observing rather slow
transitions using light signals which are very fast, so these matters
become negligible.
6In a Hilbert space model, which can assume lossless probabilities
of a closed system, the + and - are natural Hermitian conjugates.
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play a prominent or a negligible role in the observed
outcomes.
The main difference in between equation (2) and
equation (3) is that there is now a promise with an
explicit dependence of a prior outcome from another
promise, which is propagated from one agent to an-
other. This was implicitly present in the acknowledg-
ment of observable transmission, but it also carries
over into successive interactions (e.g. ‘collisions’ or
transmission relays). All the elements are therefore in
place, from the discussion of observability, to cover
these interactions.
There are two things to note: first, receptor promises
(−bA) are the key to transmission of influence. In-
fluence is not conferred automatically by emission
of a signal alone—absorption is an autonomous be-
haviour too. Next, the foregoing implies that inter-
mediate agents play a key role in forming barriers
to transmission (e.g. we can think of the purpose of
vaccines to stem disease transmission), as long as they
don’t make an independent promise to accept and relay
information from a prior agent in the chain with high
fidelity. Intermediate agents therefore also serve as the
elementary construction for modelling noise and other
environmental input channels within a fundamental
system. The intermediaries may be:
• Intentionally bad actors.
• Faulty, low fidelity replicators.
• In possession of covert channels that accept infor-
mation from other sources in the ‘environment’
E:
I
−bE−−−→ E. (42)
Such influences would impinge on the relay func-
tion for propagation from S to R if the promise
in (3) were replaced by
I
+bI | bs,bE−−−−−−−→ . (43)
The relationship between bS and bI is of crucial
interest in determining faithful propagation along a
chain. From a state of initial causal independence,
there is no reason why S and I should make the
same promise, unless they have been calibrated by a
‘global symmetry’ pertaining to all agents. Although
such global symmetries exist in nature, from particle
physics to biology, the reason for them is unclear
and they seems to violate local relativity principles.
All such agents appear to have a common origin, or
promise to accept causal influence from a common
source (see the matroid pattern in [1]):
S
−bM−−−→ M (44)
I
−bM−−−→ M (45)
and
S
+bS |bM−−−−−→ A (46)
I
+bI |bM−−−−−→ A′. (47)
In biology, this is indeed the case, where cells are
formed by replication from a single source. In par-
ticle physics, we simply don’t know what underlying
information is at work.
VII. SUMMARY
Comparing Shannon’s statistical theory of commu-
nication, commonly known as Information Theory, we
find that Promise Theory’s simple partial ordering both
simplifies the notations, suppressing probabilities, and
thus eliminates the need to define statistical ensembles,
with all the attendant assumptions therein. The proba-
bilistic formulae for the various informational entropies
are based on statistical ensembles and observations, but
the causal concepts are available on a deeper level, as
we can see explicitly in Promise Theory. The promise
formulation shares something with formalisms like
Quantum Field Theory; this is to be expected, given
the prominence of agent relativity. The Shannon theory
is an absolute spacetime theory, which is adequate for
its technical origins, but which is unsuitable for more
general processes.
In order for agents to give up their autonomy and
become a completely deterministic game piece, within
a ballistic model of motion, like a Newtonian system
or a Markov chain, they have to be calibrated to the
same identical promises (spacetime homogeneity), and
they have to completely forego individual autonomy
(locality). A priori autonomy, or causal independence,
is an axiom in Promise Theory, represented by the need
for (-) polar promises. This is the natural ‘bare’ state of
any agent. The addition of promises may then constrain
agents to cooperate. This is consistent with the con-
clusions reached in [5], which introduce probabilistic
considerations, perhaps unnecessarily. The reason is
clearly due to the underlying causal ordering implicit
in the information channel. This model may also be
seen as a deeper structural explication of the Causal
Set spacetime model developed for discrete spacetime
structure [9]–[13].
Causal independence is not really a pervasive prop-
erty of an agent, but rather it’s a property of each
promise made by an agent. Certain promises may be
entirely determined by exterior influence (or at least
be indistinguishable from being entirely determined
to an external observer), whereas others may appear
entirely autonomous. This has as much to do with
promise observability as autonomy—which, indeed, is
the curse of relativity: being trapped within the rules
of the system one aims to observe.
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